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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING DRAPER'S 
SECOND PETITION BECAUSE ITS CLAIM HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
ADJUDICATED AND BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FRVIOLOUS ON ITS FACE. 
INSTEAD THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN DRAPER LEAVE TO AMEND 
THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE SECOND PETITION 
Rule 65C(g)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that if a petition for post-conviction relief is "not frivolous 
on its face but deficient due to a pleading error or failure to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return 
a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days...." 
(emphasis added). The State asserts that this section is not 
applicable to this case because Draper's Second Petition "was 
dismissed as frivolous on its face because successive" and 
because the "October 1996 judgment of dismissal did not involve a 
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"pleading error"' (Br. of Appellee at 10). Therefore, according 
to the State, in his Second Petition, "Draper was precluded from 
obtaining post-conviction relief because he could have raised his 
ineffectiveness claim in his First Petition, but did not" (Br. of 
Appellee at 11) . 
However, Rule 65C(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not automatically bar relief for any claim which could have 
been raised in a prior petition. Instead Rule 65C(c) simply 
requires that such claims must be accompanied by "good cause 
shown." U.R.C.P. 65C(c). Contrary to the State's assertion, 
Draper is not automatically barred from relief from Don Elkins' 
ineffectiveness because such a claim was not included in the 
First Petition. Draper need only show good cause why such a 
claim was not included in the prior proceeding. 
Moreover, whether Draper's ineffectiveness claim should have 
been raised in his First Petitition is a question of fact that is 
not appropriate for summary dismissal. Likewise, whether "the 
interests of justice require" the trial court "to excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file" within the one-year time limitation 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 78-35a-107 is also a 
question of fact not appropriate for summary dismissal. 
Rule 65C(g)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
for summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim for relief only 
"if its apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated 
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in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears 
frivolous on its face" (emphasis added). Draper's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel—which is the sole claim 
addressed by his Second Petition—has not been previously 
adjudicated. 
The trial court dismissed Draper's Second Petition in part 
because "the single issue it contains was already adjudicated in 
a prior proceeding" (R. 10). However, the trial court's order of 
dismissal is not supported by its conclusions of law where the 
trial court specifically found that "the prior petition did not 
contain the claim contained in the instant petitition" (R. 10). 
Therefore, the Second Petition could only have been properly 
dismissed summarily if it was "frivolous on its face." 
Rule 65C(g)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines 
when a petition for post-conviction relief is "frivolous on its 
face": "A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely 
on the allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments, it 
appears that: (A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for 
relief as a matter of law; (B) the claims have no arguable basis 
in fact; or (C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the 
sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition." 
Draper's ineffectiveness claims clearly have an arguable basis in 
fact. 
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Accordingly, Draperfs Second Petition should not have been 
summarily dismissed by the trial court. One, because the 
ineffectiveness claim has not been previously adjudicated; and 
two, because the petition is not "frivolous on its face." 
Draper concedes that his Second Petition was deficient 
either "due to a pleading error" or in its "failure to comply 
with the requirements" of Rule 65C. U.R.C.P. 65C(g)(3). 
Specifically, Draper's Second Petition erroneously did not fully 
set forth the "good cause" as to why Draper's ineffectiveness 
claim was not filed in his First Petition and it likewise 
erroneously failed to fully advise the trial court why the 
"interests of justice" required that the one-year time limitation 
of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-35a-107 be excused. Evidence 
of both the aforementioned "good cause" and "interests of 
justice" must be present before Draper can obtain post-conviction 
relief in this case. However, his failure to initially provide 
the trial court with these requisite alleged facts renders his 
Second Petition not frivolous but deficient for "failure to 
comply with the requirements of this rule..." U.R.C.P. 65C(g)(3). 
Accordingly, the trial court was obligated under Rule 65C(g) (3) 
to "return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 
days...." 
Because the Second Petition should not have been summarily 
dismissed but should have been returned to Draper with leave to 
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amend, Draper fs Motion to Reconsider—which is essentially the 
amended petition that the trial court was obligated to accept 
under Rule 65C(g)(3) if filed within twenty days—should have 
been considered by the trial court to be a proper motion for 
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The trial court's erroneous summary dismissal of Draper's 
deficient—but not frivolous—petition and its failure to return 
the petition to Draper with leave to amend the deficiencies 
sufficiently justifies relief from the operation of the erroneous 
dismissal under Rule 60(b)(7). Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in its conclusion that Draper's Motion to Reconsider was 
not a proper Rule 60(b) motion and in its failure to accept the 
Motion to Reconsider as an amended Second Petition. 
CQNCIfUSIQF AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Draper asks that this Court conclude that the trial court 
erred in summarily dismissing Draper's Second Petition. This 
Court should reverse the trial court and remand this matter back 
to the trial court with instructions that Draper's Motion to 
Reconsider should be considered an amended Second Petition that 
should be served on the State and decided on its merits. 
Alternatively, Draper asks that this Court remand this matter 
with instructions that Draper is to be granted leave to file an 
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amended petition to correct the deficiencies in the Second 
Petition as originally filed. 
DATED this Q^\ day of December, 1997. 
iU OM4. 
Stanley l^rSma^th 
Attorney (tor Draper 
>CL1^V 
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